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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN J. STAKER, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
HUNTINGTON CLEVELA~D 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, : 
Defendant-
Appe 11 ant. 
No. 18203 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant Irrigation 
Company to recover overpayments made by Plaintiff to Defendant 
on water in the Joe's Valley project constructed under the 
Bureau of Reclamation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower Court found the facts in favor of the 
Plaintiff, awarding Plaintiff judgment in the principal 
amount of $5,031.50, together with interest in the arnount~of 
$3,283.00 and costs in the sum of $29.70, for a total judgment 
of $8,344.25. 
REiIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks an affirmance of the lower Court's 
decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant's recitation of the facts deals almost 
exclusively with procedur_al matters. For purposes of clarity 
and response, the following factual summary is in two parts. 
A. SUBS_TAl~TIVE FACTS. 1 In March of 1966, the 
Defendant solicited its shareholders,. including the Plaintiff, 
to subscribe for Joe's Valley project water, and stated in 
the invitation to the stockholders that a $1.00 per acre foot 
charge would be made for each acre foot subscribed to or for. 
Pursuant to such invitation, Plaintiff subscribed 
for 2,500 acre feet and made payment in the sum of $2,500.00 
to the Defendant company.. Defendant did not readily find 
subscribers for all water for which its shareholders were 
eligible, and accordingly it invited additional subscriptions 
from those who had already subscribed, including Plaintiff. 
As a result, Plaintiff subscribed for an additional 500 acre 
feet, making a total of 3,000 acre feet, and paid an additional 
$500.00 to the Defendant Company. 
During the years 1967, 1968 and 1969, the Defendant 
irrigation company sent billings to the Plaintiff for 3,000 
acre feet of project water at the rate of $1.55 per acre 
foot. In its billings to ~laintiff and other shareholders, 
1 h' f . T e acts as recited were, for the most part, expressly 
found by the District Court (R. 41) and ar~ not in dispute on 
appeal. Where recited facts were not included in the Court's 
written findings, specific refe-rence is made to the trial 
transcript. 
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Defendant indicated that there would be adjustments in the 
water actually received by the shareholders, and that the 
Irrigation Company would reimburse the stockholders for any 
overpayment for water not received. Plaintiff paid as per 
the billings. 
In due course, Plaintiff's participation in the 
project water was cut first from 3,000 acre feet to 2,200 
acre feet, and then cut a second time to 1,900 acre feet and 
a third time to 1,890 acre feet. The project water thus cut 
back from the shareholders, notably Plaintiff, 2 was transferred 
to Utah Power and Light along with other project water for 
use in its power generating facilities in Emery County. In 
1975, and pursuant to agreement, the Power Company paid to 
the Irrigation Company $5.00 for each acre foot of project 
water r~leased or relinquished to it by the Irrigation Company 
or its stockholders.. This money, by agreement, was to reim-
burse the Irrigation Company and its stockholders for preparing 
their lands and enlarging their canals and ditches in order 
to be able to use the project water. The money employed' by 
the Irrigation Company had come from the stockholder assess-
ments and subscription fees referred to above. 
Sometime during 1975 the money received by the 
2 Only a few of Defendant's shareholders were affected by 
the cutbacks, and according to the testimony the impact on 
Plaintiff was over three times as great as·on anyone else 
( R. 9 7 and 9 8 ) • 
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Irrigation Company from Utah Power and Light was used by the 
Irrigation Company to satisfy a debt it had with the Emery 
County Water Conservancy District, 3 and none bf it was used 
to reimburse shareholders for the subscription fee and the 
assessments paid on the project water which they were obliged 
to relinquish .. 
After learning of the payment to the Conservancy 
District, Plaintiff discussed the promised refund with 
Defendant's president and was assured, "You definitely are 
going to get your money." (Tr. 36) Plaintiff relied on this 
assurance {Tr. 37), as well as other assurances from the 
Defendant's president, up until the latter was replaced in 
that position (Tr. 38). These conversations were within the 
time frame contemplated by the applicable statute of limita-
t . 4 ions. About two years after the change in Irrigation 
Company officials, Plaintiff, for the first time, was advised 
by the new president that he would not be paid (Tr. 39). 5 
Plaintiff filed this action on March 29, 1979. 
3 By making payment to the Conservancy District when it 
did, the Defendant Irrigation Company apparently received a 
reduction in the amount of its debt (Tr. 37). 
4 There were conversations in the latter part of 1975 
(Tr. 37) and later (Tr. 38). 
5 Mr. James Staker, who was a member of Defendant's board 
of directors during all relevant times, learned of the decision 
not to reimburse Plaintiff after leaving :the board in 1978 
(Tr .. 92). 
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B. PROCEDURAL FACTS. The statement of procedural 
facts contained in Defendant's brief is technically accurate, 
but incomplete and creates misimpressions. 
Defendant's procedural factual synopsis seeks to 
take advantage of an absence in the record of information 
concerning matters which were never before at issue. 
For example, Defendant asserts that notices of 
trial setting were mailed to E. J. Skeen rather than Thomas 
O. Parker. Counsel asserts that Thomas o. Parker was in 
Egypt. The record does reflect that E. J. Skeen has the same 
mailing address as Parker, but since the issue was not raised 
in the trial· court, there is no explanation in the record as 
to why the trial Court sent the mailings to Skeen. It is 
reasonable to :o-i.ssume that if such issue had been raised, the 
trial Court could have made a record thereon. 
Defendant's counsel asserts that he was retained 
two days before trial, though in the absence of a motion for 
a continuance or some objection to the trial going forward 
there is no record which addresses the matter of prior contacts 
between Mr. Litizzette, Mr. Parker, Mr. Skeen and Plaintiff's 
counsel, nor of their various contact$ with the Court or with 
the Defendant. Such facts were not broached at the time of 
trial for the reason that Defendant's counsel made no issue 
of the notice of trial setting n.or of the Shortness of. time 
in which he had been involved. 
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If the issues noted would have been raised then the 
trial Court could have addressed the same, and the record 
could have been more complete thereon. Defendant's effort to 
take advantage of them at this stage does not seem appropriate. 
ARUGMENT 
POIN'r I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT' S MOTION MADE. ON THE DAY 
OF TRIAL TO AMEND THE ANSWER TO ALLOW THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE 
Under Rule 12(h) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Defendant waives defenses not presented in his answer. That 
section is applicable to the defense of the statute of limita-
tions. Tygesen v. Magna Water Company, 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 
Pac. 456 (1962). 
In denying the Defendant's motion to amend, filed 
the morning of trial, the trial Court observed, 
This case has been set, I believe, twice 
before. And, in other words, it was filed 
clear back in March of 1979; the exact dates 
and amounts claimed.are set forth in particu-. 
larity in the complaint. So that if the 
Defendants wanted to take advantage of the 
statute of limitations, they had plenty of-
opportunity to do so. Then the Plaintiff 
would have had the opportunity at least, to 
approach his case from the stand point of 
when did his cause of action arise and this 
sort of thing. We think it unfair to present 
it at this late date. • • • [Tr. 143] 
[Emphasis added.] 
The Court's finding of "unfairness" is amply sup-
ported. At the beginning of the trial, Plaintiff's counsel 
advised the Court as follows, 
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.•. [A]nd in addition we have not prepared to 
address that issue because it has never been 
raised. And we simple have not undertaken to 
prepare the case if put in this posture. we 
advi~ed through responses through the interrog-
atories early on exactly what our position 
was, specifically every document that we would 
introduce. And it's never been raised and 
here we are. The first indication I ever had 
was yesterday afternoon. So we're simply not 
ready to try that and I think it would prejudice 
our position. [Tr. 8] 
Under Rule 15(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
leave to amend should be freely given "when justice so 
requires." In those cases where the Court has granted leave 
to amend, there appears uniformly to have been a finding that 
no prejudice resulted to the other party. See, e.g., Evans 
et al. v. Houtz et al~, 57 Utah 216, 193 Pac. 858 (1920); 
Shay v. Union ?ac. R. Co., 47 Utah 252, 153 Pac. 31 (1915); 
Benson v. Railroad, 35 Utah 241, 99 Pac. 1072 (1909). 
In addition to the finding of "unfairness", the 
exercise of discretion by the trial court is supported by the 
following findings appearing at page 45 of the record: 
22. That Plaintiff oleaded his case with 
specificity, settingLforth not only his 
theory but also particular dates and the 
payments made for which he claimed reimburse-
ment. 
23. That further, in response to discovery 
procedures employed by Defendant, Plaintiff 
responded with specificity, setting forth the 
exact nature of his claim and the exact 
·documents on which he intended to rely, 
including the date of those documents. 
24. That Plaintiff further offered to make 
all documents on which he intended to rely 
available to Defendant for inspection and 
photocopying. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-8-
25. That the evidence introduced at trial, 
and on which Plaintiff relied, consisted of 
the precise documents which it had outlined 
in its response to Defendant's discovery. 
The Court relied on the case of Goeltz v. Continental 
Bank and T:rust Co., 5 Utah 2d 204, 299 P.2d 832 (1956), which 
deals specifically wi.th a delinquent motion to amend to 
include the statute of limitations. That case sheds light on 
the phrase, "when justice so requires. 116 The Court said, 
Statutes of limitations as statutes of repose 
have a useful function in our .law systeme 
Sometimes they prevent the prosecution of a 
stale claim after proof of the facts are 
unavailable, and in such a case the interests 
of justice would require that leave to amend 
be freely granted. In other ca$es .such · 
defense merely prevents a recovery of a just 
claim. • •• Here defendant seeks leave to 
amend after all the evidence is in, even 
though all the facts upon which this defense 
is based have been fully known by the bank, 
since the original certificates were .deposited 
with it in March of 1947 and no new evidence 
was discovered during the trial which made 
this defense available where it had not been 
available under the facts known by the bank in 
the first instance. [at 207.] [Emphasis 
added.] 
The court in Goeltz went on to address Rule 15(b) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows amendmen-ts,· i'when 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby." In a comment alluding to both lS(a) and lS(b), 
the Supreme Court said, 
6 As heretofore noted, amendments are to be freely allowed 
"when justice so requires." [Rule 15 (a) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure] 
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The facts which were determinative of that 
question were known to defendant from the 
inception of plaintiff's claim and were fully 
pleaded in defendant's answer. Defendant's 
only failure in pleading was to assert the 
statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiff's 
claim, and that is the only amendment which it 
asked leave to make .•• ~These rules require 
that leave to amend be freely given when 
justice so requires or when the presentation 
of the merits of the action will be subserved. 
As we have already seen, justice does not 
require this amendment, nor does the presenta-
tion of the merits of the action so require 
it, for to defeat a claim by the bar of the 
statute of limitations is not a determination 
of a c·ase on its merits. [at 208.] [Emphasis 
added.] 
In the case before the Court, the trial Court found 
that the statute of limitations didn't vary the substantive 
matters of the case {Tr. 143). There was no problem with 
"staleness~, and Plaintiff's evidence was clear and succinct. 
There was an indication of a defense witness not being able 
to remember some detail after the expiration of time covered 
by the case, but the Court found such detail was not "really 
material", and not such as "would materially alter the decision 
of the Court." (Tr. 144.) 
The burden on Defendant-Appellant in this Court· is 
a stiff one. The applicable standard governing trial court 
discretion was set forth by this Court in Searle v .. Searle, 
522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974) in which it was said, 
The actions of the trial court are indulged 
with a presumption of validity, and the 
burden is upon appellant to prove such a 
· serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion. [at 700.] 
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To the degree that the Court's exercise of discretion 
is dependant on findings, the following is applicable, 
••• [T]his court is constrained to look at 
the whole of the evidence. in the light favor-
able to the trial court's findings, including 
· any fair inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence and all of the circumstances shown. 
The trial court's findings shall not be 
disturbed unless the evidence is such that 
all reasonable minds would be persuaded to 
the contrary.. [Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 
Pa2d 751 (Utah, 1977), at 753.] 
It should be noted that the failure to plead the 
statute of limitations may not have been inadvertent or 
unintentional, since there is evidence in the record which 
would support a position that Plaintiff's cause of action did 
not arise until the money received from Utah Power and Light 
was misapplied by the Irrigation Company. Up until then, 
Plaintiff had every reason to expect that he would be fully 
reimbursed out of this money. Even after such misapplication 
by the Defendant, it continued to assure Plaintiff that he 
would be paid .. On this ground Defendant's original counsel 
may well have determined that there was a sound basis for 
avoiding a strict application of the statute of limitations. 
Since the proposed amendment would have required 
proof of matters not contemplated by Plaintiff in its prepara-
tion, and since then~ was a complete absence of any surprises 
in Plaintiff's evidence, and no proof problems relating to 
"staleness", and since the trial resulted ~nan "adjudication 
on the merits", it was fitting and proper and well within the 
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Court's discretion to deny the proposed amendment, and, in 
fact, to have allowed it could have "prevented recovery of a 
just claim," and could have· hindered rather than fostered a 
fair and just conclusion. An amendment which will not further 
the interests of justice should not be allowed. See Bradford 
v. Alvey and Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah, 1980). 7 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT CANNOT CLAIM IMPROPER 
NOTICE OF TRIAL WHEN SUCH ISSUE WAS 
NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT 
As noted in the factual summary, the record is 
skimpy regarding the procedure employed in giving notice of 
trial. That is so because the issue was not raised in the 
trial Court. 
Since the Defendant appeared for trial and raised 
no objection regarding the notice, and did not question the 
sufficiency thereof nor the propriety of the trial going 
forward, it is too late. to do so at this stage. As was said 
in Hanover Ltd. v .. Fie_lds, supra at 753, 
••• [I]ssues not raised in the pleadings nor 
presented at trial •.. cannot be considered 
for the first time on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED INTEREST 
In Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315 
(Utah, 1977) this Court said, 
7 lihile this case involved Rule 15 (b} Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rather than 15(a), the principle is the same. 
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As to the al lowanc.e of interest before 
judgment, this Court has heretofore spoken, 
and the law in Utah is clear, viz: where the 
damage is complete and the amount of the loss 
is fixed as of a particular time, and that 
loss can be measured by facts and figures, 
interest should be allowed from· that time and 
not fr9m the date of the judgment. On the 
other hand, where damages are incomplete or 
cannot be calculated with mathematical accu~acy, 
such as in case of personal injury, wrongful 
death, defamation of character, false imprison-
ment, etc., the-amount of the damage must be 
ascertained and assessed by the trier of the 
fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment 
interest in not allowed. [at 317.] [Emphasis 
added.] 
Applying the standard thus enunciated to the facts of this 
case, the following appears: 
In paragraph number eleven of his complaint (R. 2) 
-Plaintiff alleged as follows: 
11. That the excess payments made by 
Plaintiff are as follows, to-wit: 
(a) Overpayment on subscription, 
$1.00 per acre foot for 1,110 acre feet (3,000 
less 1,890), which totals $1,110.00. 
(b) Excess 1967 assessment, $1.55 
on 1,110 acre feet, which totals $1,720.50. 
(c) Excess 1968 assessment, $1.55 
on 1,110 acre feet, which totals $1,720.50. · 
(d) Excess 1969 assessment, $1.55 
on 310 acre feet (2,200 acre feet less 1,890 
acre feet), which totals $480.50. 
Total amount of the foregoing is FIVE THOUSAND 
THIRTY-ONE AND 50/100 DOLLARS ($5,031.50). 
There was no factual dispute as to the amounts in 
ques·tion, and the Court awarded Plaintiff judgment for the 
amount alleged in his complaint. The Court further found 
that the final adJustment on Plaintiff's oro-iect water 
[~ 
~QC? 
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occurred during the year 1972, and accordingly the proper 
refund amounts were fully fixed dur·ing that year (R. 44). 
The Court awarded interest beginning January 1, 1973. 
Defendant has recited language from Am. Jur. 
indicating that interest should be- awarded "as a.result of 
the justice of the individual case." 22 Am. Jur. 2d §·179. 
In this connection, it is pointed out that by January 1, 
1973, when interest commenced to run by Court decree, Plaintiff 
had already been without the use of his money for several 
years, and further when the Irrigation Company elected to 
apply the Utah Power and Light money for its own purposes 
rather than to make refunds to shareholders, it received a 
·- direct benefit by negotiating a reduction of the debt it owed 
to the Emery County Water Conservancy District. (Tr. 37) 
What may be considered as relating to "the justice 
of the individual case" are the facts set forth in the follow-
ing testimony of Irrigation Company board of directors member 
Dick Allen, extracted during cross-examination. After acknow-
!edging that the money received from Utah Power and Light had 
been paid to the Emery County Water Conservancy District, 
with none going to shareholders, Allen said {Tr. 125): 
Q {by Mr. Mclff) All right. Did you 
discuss thereafter that you would try to raise 
the money and pay the _shareholders some other 
way? 
A Wel 1, there was some arg-ument but no 
firm decisions because the attorney said we 
signed no contract and so we weren't liable. 
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Q I see. So his advice was, JUSt not to 
pay those shareholders based on the fact there 
was no written contract signed? 
A Yes. . . . . . t 8 Nothing in writing to prove 1 • 
Mr. Mciff: I see. All right. That's 
all I have. 
In light of Bjork v. Ap_ril Industries, Inc., 
supra, plaintiff was likely entitled to interest as a matter 
of law, though if an award of interest were discretionary with the 
district judge, then such discretion was well exercised and 
is. entitled to a presumption of validity under the case law 
heretofore cited. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial Court should be affirmed 
in all respects, and Plaintiff should be awarded his costs on 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this~/ '!i:tday of June, 
1982. 
8 While apparently there were no signed contracts, the 
promised refunds were proven by three written instruments 
(Findings number 10.-13, R. 42-43), by statements made to 
Plaintiff by Irrigation.Company officials (Findings number 
14, R. 43), and by two minute entries from meetings of 
Defendant's board of directors (Findings number 14, R. 43). 
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Mr. S. v. Litizzette 
178 South Main Street 
Helper, Utah 84526 
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